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ABSTRACT
This paper hypothesizes that segregation in US cities increases as racial inequality narrows due to
the emergence of middle-class black neighborhoods. Employing a novel research design based on
life-cycle variations in the relationship between segregation and inequality, we test this hypothesis
using the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. Indeed, increased black educational attainment in a city leads to
a significant rise in the number of middle-class black communities and segregation for older adults
both in the cross-section and over time, consistent with our hypothesis. These findings imply a negative
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Residential segregation has long been established as an important barrier to the narrowing of
historical racial dierences in education, income, and wealth in the United States. Cutler and
Glaeser (1997) have shown convincingly, for example, that young blacks have signicantly worse
educational and labor market outcomes than whites in more segregated cities. The extent of
racial inequality in a city also aects the way that households sort across neighborhoods, thereby
inuencing the level of segregation that arises in equilibrium. In this way, residential segregation and
racial inequality are linked in an intergenerational feedback loop, with today's level of segregation
aecting future inequality, which in turn alters the extent of segregation to emerge in the city.
This feedback loop has potentially important consequences for the long-run persistence of racial
dierences in education and income. As such, the task of understanding both the character of the
feedback (whether positive or negative in nature) and the strength of the contributing forces is of
general policy interest. Yet while the rst part of this loop { the eect of segregation on racial
inequality { has been well-studied, the second part { how racial inequality aects the extent of
segregation in a city { has received less attention, possibly because the nature of this relationship
seems obvious. For example, given that higher-income households are likely to sort into neighbor-
hoods with bigger houses and better amenities, we might naturally expect greater racial inequality
to lead to more racial segregation, implying a positive segregation-inequality relationship, simply
because of sorting in dimensions correlated with race.1
In this paper, we explore a neighborhood formation mechanism that may generate a negative
relationship between residential segregation and racial inequality, in contrast to the standard in-
tuition. Decentralized residential choice implies that the neighborhood choice set is endogenous,
with the characteristics of the available neighborhoods in a city being determined in equilibrium
through household sorting. With this in mind, suppose that the proportion of highly educated
blacks were to increase from a previously low level, holding xed the educational attainment of
whites in the city. This reduction in racial inequality would allow new middle-class black neighbor-
hoods to emerge, and these would likely be attractive to black households, especially among the
highly educated, potentially leading to increases in residential segregation as households re-sorted.
To formalize our neighborhood formation mechanism, we present a simple equilibrium model
of residential choice that serves to link a metropolitan area's sociodemographic composition to its
level of neighborhood segregation on the basis of race. If households do not care about the race
of their neighbors when deciding where to live, we show that socioeconomic inequality and racial
segregation exhibit a monotonic positive relationship; that is, the standard intuition holds, with
declines in the level of racial inequality being associated with reductions in segregation. Yet such
1 Given the correlation between race and socioeconomic status, Schelling (1969, 1971) noted that racial segregation
would arise in the housing market even in the absence of explicit sorting on the basis of race.
1monotonicity breaks down in the more general case when racial considerations also aect household
location choices. Here, if the proportion of highly educated blacks is suciently low, the choice set
is restricted in the sense that middle-class black neighborhoods are scarce; and facing this choice
constraint, highly educated blacks reside in either largely white, highly educated communities or
less-educated, predominantly black communities. As the proportion of highly educated blacks in
a city increases, this expands the set of available neighborhood options through the emergence of
new middle-class black neighborhoods.2 While segregation may fall initially, at some point the new
neighborhood options provide an opportunity for segregation to rise as blacks and especially highly
educated blacks move from predominantly white neighborhoods into these new middle-class black
neighborhoods. Our model makes explicit how such increases in residential segregation can occur
as inequality narrows.
Our focus on neighborhood formation is motivated by three stylized observations about the set of
neighborhoods currently available in U.S. metropolitan areas. First, the vast majority of metropol-
itan areas contain very few middle-class black neighborhoods. Second, given the limited availability
of these neighborhoods, a substantial fraction of highly educated blacks (education proxying for
socioeconomic status (`SES') more generally) do in fact reside in predominantly white, high-SES
neighborhoods, while a substantial fraction of others reside in predominantly black, low-SES neigh-
borhoods. This suggests that many highly educated blacks might well prefer to locate in middle-
class black neighborhoods were they available.3 Third, metropolitan areas with a higher proportion
of highly educated blacks tend to contain a greater number of middle-class black neighborhoods.
Together, these facts make clear that the conditions needed for middle-class black neighborhood for-
mation to inuence segregation might obtain in practice. And this raises the possibility that, were
the proportion of highly educated blacks to increase and thus expand the number of middle-class
black neighborhoods (as the descriptive evidence suggests), so an empirically signicant increase in
segregation could result after household re-sorting.
We are interested in exploring the empirical relevance of this possible channel. As a precursor
to our empirical analysis, it is worth emphasizing that the negative correlation between racial in-
equality and residential segregation predicted by the neighborhood formation mechanism is in stark
contrast to the positive correlation arising from a variety of well-known alternative mechanisms.
For example, direct sorting on the basis of education and income (a la Schelling) would tend to
lead to an increase in racial segregation as a side product when racial inequality increased, for
2We use the terminology `emergence' or `formation' of middle-class black neighborhoods to refer to not only the
literal development of such neighborhoods from new housing construction, but also an increased concentration of
middle-class blacks within existing neighborhoods.
3This is consistent with Vigdor's (2003) nding that \the nationwide proportion of Black households with few or
no Black neighbors exceeds the proportion stating a preference for such neighborhoods" (p. 589).
2the reason highlighted above.4 Similarly, if discrimination played an important role in the housing
and mortgage markets and contributed to residential segregation in a non-trivial way, then to the
extent that better-educated blacks were signicantly less discriminated against, we would expect
narrowing racial inequality to lead to reductions in segregation. And also working in the same
direction, the well-established `neighborhood eects' channel studied in Cutler and Glaeser (1997,
henceforth `CG') implies, for younger blacks at least, a strong positive correlation between racial
inequality and segregation. Taken together, these contrasting inequality-segregation eects provide
the basis for potentially fruitful empirical strategies, which we seek to develop and use.
The central empirical goal of this paper is to shed light on the importance of the neighbor-
hood formation channel in the presence of the mechanisms outlined above { particularly CG's
neighborhood eects channel { that yield competing predictions. To that end, we propose a new
two-part research design, taking advantage of dierential relations between black-white education
inequality and neighborhood segregation across individuals' life cycles. The key idea is that CG's
neighborhood eects channel, which predicts a positive correlation between racial inequality and
segregation, is strongest for young blacks { those either of school age or recently educated; in
contrast, our neighborhood formation mechanism generates a negative relationship between racial
inequality and segregation for blacks of all ages, and should be especially strong for older blacks,
whose education has been long since pre-determined.
Building on this idea, in the rst part of our research design, we argue that if our neighborhood
formation mechanism operates strongly in the data, one would expect to see a negative cross-
sectional correlation between inequality and segregation for older blacks. This is indeed what we
nd using Census data: controlling for white educational attainment, the proportion of highly
educated blacks aged 40 and above in a metropolitan area increases in the level of neighborhood
segregation, implying a strong negative cross-sectional relationship between racial inequality and
segregation for this older age group. This nding is surprising because it implies that the force of our
neighborhood formation mechanism not only overcomes the opposing force of CG's neighborhood
eects channel, but also the other forces tending in the opposite direction, such as statistical
discrimination in the housing and mortgage markets, as well Schelling-type within-metropolitan
area sorting on the basis of correlated socioeconomic characteristics!
In the second part of our research design, we examine time-series evidence using rst dier-
ences. Given that CG's neighborhood eects mechanism operates only for younger blacks and our
neighborhood formation mechanism operates throughout the life cycle, the underlying idea is that
the latter should dominate upon dierencing over time. Further, the strength of our mechanism
should be identied by the rst-dierence eect of changes in segregation regressed on changes in
4A number of studies have estimated the contributions of socioeconomic characteristics in explaining cross-sectional
variation in racial segregation. See Miller and Quigley (1990), Harsman and Quigley (1995) and Bayer, McMillan
and Rueben (2004), among others.
3neighborhood educational attainment for older blacks, controlling for changes in the education of
whites. Implementing this rst-dierencing approach using Census data, we show that increases in
the proportion of highly educated blacks relative to whites in a metropolitan area between 1990 and
2000 are associated with signicant increases in overall racial segregation, given the educational
attainment of whites. And unlike the cross-sectional evidence, rst-dierencing allows us to remove
the eects of xed city-level factors that may correlate segregation and the educational attainment
of blacks relative to whites for other reasons. When we look specically at older blacks, we nd
that increases in the proportion of highly educated blacks (again controlling for white education)
are associated with strongly positive increases in city-wide segregation; as argued, such increases
should reect the strength of the neighborhood formation mechanism alone.5 We also nd that such
changes are associated with signicant increases in the number of middle-class black neighborhoods,
as hypothesized under our neighborhood formation mechanism.
Our ndings have signicant implications for the inter-related dynamics of segregation and racial
inequality, shedding light on both the nature and strength of the intergenerational feedback loop
referred to above. When combined with the central nding of CG, our results imply that residential
segregation and racial socioeconomic inequality evolve jointly according to a negative feedback.
Specically, following a reduction in across-race inequality, our results indicate that this will lead
to an increase in segregation, which would then { following CG's mechanism { lead to a worsening of
the educational and labor market outcomes for young blacks relative to whites, in turn increasing
inequality across race. Because of this negative feedback loop, the intergenerational movement
towards socioeconomic convergence across races will tend to be inhibited.6 As a renement, we also
identify conditions under which the eects of this negative feedback will be mitigated, specically
when (other things equal) the proportion of highly educated blacks in a city is suciently high.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we set out a simple equilibrium
sorting model and show how increasing the proportion of highly educated blacks in a city while
holding white education xed may lead to increases in segregation due the formation of new neigh-
borhoods. Section 3 presents the empirical motivation for our hypothesis linking neighborhood
formation to changes in residential segregation, making clear that the conditions for increases in
segregation to occur do appear to hold in the data. In Section 4, we explain our two-part research
design in detail and present our main empirical evidence, shedding light on the relationship between
neighborhood segregation and racial inequality, both in cross section and using rst-dierences over
time. Complementary evidence is provided in Section 5, along with evidence that our results are
5In Section 5, we also present evidence indicating that the positive relation we nd is due primarily to within-
rather than across-metropolitan area sorting.
6The persistence of racial inequality is an important theme in the work of Loury (1977). His research draws
attention to a negative externality in the accumulation of human capital, which gives rise to persistent dierences in
income across race.
4robust to alternative explanations. We set out the implications of our ndings in Section 6; and
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Neighborhood Formation Mechanism in Theory
In this section, we formalize the neighborhood formation mechanism we have in mind, presenting
a simple equilibrium sorting model to clarify the relationship between the sociodemographic compo-
sition of a metropolitan area and neighborhood segregation.7 In particular, we consider increasing
the proportion of highly educated blacks in the metropolitan area while holding the education of
whites xed; and we show how this change may lead to greater residential segregation by race due
to the emergence of new middle-class black neighborhoods.8
Neighborhoods. Consider a metropolitan area with a total mass of households equal to 1.
Suppose that a fraction  2 (0;1) of these households is black, with the remainder 1    being
white. The total number of neighborhoods is xed at J. Let the number of available houses (or
slots) in neighborhood j 2 f1;:::;Jg be nj, and assume that all houses are identical, with the total
number of available slots across all neighborhoods being equal to the total number of households,
i.e.,
PJ
j=1 nj = 1:
Neighborhood j 2 f1;:::;Jg is characterized by two attributes. The rst, the exogenous amenity
level of neighborhood j, is denoted by qj; without loss of generality, assume that q1  q2    qJ:9
The second attribute, the fraction of neighbors of the same race as household i in neighborhood j,
denoted rij, is endogenous and will be determined in equilibrium.
Households. Households are heterogeneous in their tastes for the amenity (denoted by i
for household i) and also, potentially, their preferences for the race of their neighbors (denoted by
7Our stylized residential choice model below abstracts from several considerations likely to be relevant in practice.
Commuting plays no role in location decisions, for example; thus we interpret our model as being relevant to neigh-
borhood choices after decisions regarding commutes have already been made. We also abstract from the possible
feedback from neighborhood composition to the production of individual attributes, such as educational attainment
and, more broadly, aggregate racial inequality. In our empirical analysis in Section 4, we allow for the operation of
this `neighborhood eects' channel.
8Sethi and Somanathan (2001) develop a model that helps explain the persistence of high levels of racial segregation
in many U.S. cities. Their model allows for horizontally dierentiated preferences, as is realistic, and generates several
novel results. In particular, in cities where the minority population is large, they show that both high and low levels
of racial inequality are consistent with extreme levels of segregation; when racial inequality takes on intermediate
ranges, segregated equilibria are unstable (see Figure 4 in their paper for a clear illustration), giving rise to potential
non-monotonicities, as with our mechanism. Their treatment focuses on the stability of neighborhood equilibria in
the context of a transparent two-community model, rather than the role of neighborhood formation as in our analysis.
9As in Sethi and Somanathan (2001)'s work, it is possible to endogenize the amenity level { for instance, by making
it equal to the fraction highly educated in the neighborhood. For our purposes, this generalization is not essential.
5i).10 The utility that household i with preferences (i;i) receives from living in neighborhood j
with attributes (qj;rij) is given by
Uij = iqj + irij   pj; (1)
where pj is the price of housing in neighborhood j.
We assume that a household's taste for the amenity, i, varies with the household's education
level, with education taking on two possible values: high and low. If a household is highly educated,
then its amenity taste parameter  is drawn from a continuous CDF Fh (), while if a household is
less-educated, then its  is drawn from a continuous CDF Fl (), where Fh () rst-order stochasti-
cally dominates Fl (): This captures the idea that highly educated households are more willing to
pay for amenities than less-educated households. We denote the fraction of highly educated among
all black households in the city by B 2 (0;1) and the fraction highly educated among whites,
W 2 (0;1): For simplicity, assume that the taste parameter for same-race neighbors i is identical
for all households, i.e. i =   0 for all i: Given their preferences, households simply choose to
reside in one of the J neighborhoods in order to maximize utility.11
Equilibrium. An equilibrium in this model is characterized by a rule assigning households
to neighborhoods and a vector of housing prices (p1;:::;pJ); where pJ is normalized to zero, such
that the housing markets in each neighborhood clear, and all households are in their most preferred
location given the amenity levels, racial compositions, and housing prices in all neighborhoods.
Given this simple structure, we now describe how to solve the model, rst in the simpler case
where tastes over the race of one's neighbors are switched o, i.e., when  = 0. For a given
equilibrium, we calculate a standard segregation measure, the exposure rate; then we examine
how the exposure rate changes as we increase the proportion of highly educated blacks in the
metropolitan area population, given the education of whites. The results from this exercise provide
a benchmark against which we compare the more general case where households are allowed to
have tastes over the race of their neighbors as well as preferences over exogenous amenity levels.
10The preference for same-race neighbors can either represent a pure taste for living in neighborhoods with others
of the same race or arise through indirect channels. For example, individuals of the same race might cluster together
in residential neighborhoods because they have correlated preferences for local public and private goods including
retail outlets, restaurants, newspapers, and churches (see Berry and Waldfogel, 2003; and Waldfogel, 2007). It is
unnecessary for us to take a stand as to the underlying nature of these same-race preferences. For various theoretical
arguments why individuals might care about the racial composition of their neighborhoods, see, e.g., Cornell and
Hartmann (1997), Farley et al. (1994), O'Flaherty (1999) and Lundberg and Startz (1998); for empirical evidence,
see, e.g., Ihlanfeldt and Scadi (2002), Vigdor (2003), and Charles (2000, 2001), King and Mieszkowski (1973), Yinger
(1978) and Galster (1982).
11The assumption that the blacks are free to choose from the whole set of neighborhoods is made to simplify our
argument and focus on our neighborhood formation mechanism alone. To the extent that blacks may be excluded
from living in some neighborhoods due to discrimination, we may want to view our use of the phrase that blacks
make `choices' as shorthand to include both their locational preferences and discrimination.
6We develop the basic intuition for our mechanism using a six-community example. While the
details of the parameterization are not crucial, we provide them here for completeness. In particular,
we suppose that the six neighborhoods are equal-sized, i.e. J = 6 and nj = 1=6 for all j: The
neighborhoods dier in amenity levels, with q1 = q2 = 2; q3 = q4 = 1 and q5 = q6 = 0: Also
suppose that  = 3=8;B = 1=3 initially, and W = 3=5; so the total fraction of highly educated is
1=2; i.e.
P
r2fb;wg rr = 0:5: Finally, we assume that  among the highly educated is distributed
uniformly on [400;1000]; while among the less-educated it is distributed uniformly on [0;600];
thereby allowing highly educated households to have higher willingness to pay for amenities, though
with some overlap.12
No Same-Race Preferences ( = 0): In the case where households do not care about the race
of their neighbors, neighborhoods dier in one relevant dimension only: their amenity levels. The
(essentially) unique equilibrium of the one-dimensional model is a positive assortative matching
equilibrium, where households with a high preference for amenities sort into high-amenity neigh-
borhoods, with housing prices in neighborhood j set at a level that makes the marginal household
indierent between living in neighborhood j and neighborhood j  1, the next level down in terms
of amenity quality.
The equilibrium in this case is straightforward to characterize, and can be solved for analytically.
The rst step involves nding the threshold values of  recursively that will equate the demand
with the supply of houses in each neighborhood; the second step is then to nd the housing prices
in each neighborhood to ensure that the marginal households are indierent between the neighbor-
hoods with adjacent values of amenities.13 Under the assumption that the race of residents in a
particular community is randomly drawn from blacks and whites given their educational attainment
{ reasonable given that there are no same-race preferences { we can infer the racial compositions
of each neighborhood, which we can then compute segregation indices from.14
The segregation measure that we use in this illustrative model is (as mentioned) the exposure
rate. At the individual level, the exposure rate of a household i in group g to another group g0
is the percentage of household i's neighbors that belong to group g0: In our context, consider for
12We assume uniform distributions for analytic convenience.
13Given the illustrative parameterization above when B = 1=3 and W = 3=5, in the essentially unique sorting
equilibrium, the high-amenity neighborhoods 1 and 2 will be occupied only by highly educated households with  in
the interval [600;1000]; the medium-amenity neighborhoods 3 and 4 will be occupied by a 50/50 mixture of highly
educated and less-educated residents with their  lying in the interval [400;600]; and the low-amenity neighborhoods
5 and 6 will be occupied only by the less-educated, with their 's in the interval [0;400]. The equilibrium housing
prices are p1 = p2 = 1000;p3 = p4 = 400 and p5 = p6 = 0:
14In the equilibrium described in footnote 13 for the case with B = 1=3 and W = 3=5, the fraction of residents in
neighborhoods 1 and 2 who are black is 25%; the fraction in neighborhoods 3 and 4 is 37.5%, and in neighborhoods
5 and 6, it is 50%.
7example a black household i's exposure to white neighbors (where g is `black' and g0 is `white.' At
the neighborhood level, the exposure of black households to whites is give by the average, across
all black households, of the individual exposure rates.15
Our primary interest lies in the consequences for racial segregation { specically, the exposure
rate of black households to white neighbors { of an increase in the fraction of highly educated
blacks { that is, as B approaches W from below.16 (In particular, we increase the proportion
of highly educated blacks at the expense of less-educated blacks, starting from zero, holding xed
the educational attainment of whites.) When same-race preferences are switched o, i.e. when
 = 0, the average exposure of blacks to white neighbors will be monotonically increasing in B
over the relevant range, B < W. Intuitively, as blacks shift up the education distribution, so their
tastes for higher quality public goods strengthen, and this leads to greater residential integration as
blacks and whites become more similar in this dimension. For illustration, we plot this relation in
Figure 1(a), using the parameterization given in the example. Also note that, when sorting occurs
solely on the basis of education and the associated taste for the amenity, some racial segregation
arises initially simply because race is correlated with education.17 This corresponds to the logic
in Schelling's argument (see footnote 1) that some degree of racial segregation would be expected
even in the absence of any direct preference over the race of one's neighbors.
Strictly Positive Same-Race Preferences ( > 0): We now provide an intuitive character-
ization of the equilibria for the case where households care about the race of their neighbors in
addition to amenity levels. Because analytical solutions are dicult to obtain in this more general
case, we conrm the main intuition by solving for the model's equilibria using numerical methods.
When households care about the race of their neighbors, the allocation rule described above for
the case without same-race preferences needs to be modied. Since the high-amenity neighborhoods
1 and 2 are predominantly (75%) white, whites with any given taste for amenity will now be willing
to pay more than, and thus outbid, blacks with the same taste for the amenity, due to same-race
preferences. This will drive the proportion of whites even higher, leading other whites to nd these
15Thus in our simple example, in neighborhoods 1 and 2, a black household's exposure rate to whites is 3/4, given
that 75% of the residents are white; similarly, in neighborhoods 3 and 4, black households' exposure rate to whites is
5=8; and black households' exposure to whites in neighborhoods 5 and 6 is 1/2. Since the fraction of blacks living in
neighborhoods 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6, respectively, are 1=9; 1/3 and 4/9, the average exposure rate of blacks













16Our arguments below also go through if we use an alternative segregation measure, the dissimilarity index,
adjusting for the fact that it is inversely related to our exposure rate measure. Dissimilarity indices are used in our
main empirical analysis in Section 4.
17For example, the exposure rate of 43=72 in the sorting equilibrium when B = 1=3 and W = 3=5 is lower than













(b) With Same-Race Preference:  > 0:
Figure 1: Black Households' Average Exposure Rate to White Neighbors as a Function of B.
Notes: B and W denote the fraction of highly-educated blacks and whites respectively; W denotes the fraction
of whites in the MSA population. The gures are drawn from the calculated equilibrium of the model described in
the text as B varies from 0 to W = 3=5. At at B = 

B, a black majority high-amenity neighborhood becomes
sustainable.
neighborhoods even more attractive.
To x the ideas related to our neighborhood formation mechanism, suppose that the proportion
of whites who are highly educated, W, is fairly close to one, and contrast two extremes. First,
consider a situation where the proportion of highly educated blacks among all blacks, B, is very
low. In such a case, it is impossible to have a large fraction of blacks in either one of the high-
amenity neighborhoods 1 and 2. Given that, the threshold taste level above which highly-educated
blacks will be willing to pay to live in high-amenity neighborhoods, denoted by 
B; must be higher




blacks with very high amenity taste draws will nd it optimal to live in predominantly white
neighborhoods with high amenity levels. As B increases in a range of small values starting from 0,
we would thus expect there to be more highly-educated blacks with exceptionally high values of 
who choose to live in predominantly white high-amenity neighborhoods rather than lower-amenity
neighborhoods that have greater proportions of blacks. Thus initially, we expect black households'
exposure to white neighbors to be increasing in B.
Now consider the other extreme case, where B is high and close to W: Here, it becomes
possible for the highly-educated blacks with a high taste for the neighborhood amenity to bid for
houses in at least one of the high-amenity neighborhoods and achieve a racial majority there. Once
blacks become a majority in a high-amenity neighborhood, the same-race preference will lead more
blacks (with somewhat lower 's) to move into that neighborhood, and this process could lead to
the emergence of a predominantly black high-amenity neighborhood. In this case, in contrast, the
9exposure rate of black households to white neighbors tends to be low.18
Combining these pieces of reasoning, we would expect the relation between black exposure to
whites { our measure of racial integration { and the fraction of highly-educated blacks B to
exhibit an inverted-U relationship, with a range of values for B over which the exposure rate of
black households to white neighbors declines in B. In this range, segregation and racial inequality
are negatively related. We verify that this is indeed the case in the context of our stylized residential
choice model.
Figure 1(b), drawn from the computational sorting equilibrium of the simple model, illustrates
the above argument.19 As shown, when B < 
B; there is no possibility of a black majority high-
amenity neighborhood; thus, as B increases, more and more highly-educated black households
with high- preferences live in white-majority high-amenity neighborhoods, and so blacks' average
exposure to whites increases in B. But at B = 
B; a black majority high-amenity neighborhood
becomes sustainable; and as a result, when B is larger than 
B, blacks' exposure to white neighbors
starts to decline with B as more and more highly-educated blacks move into high-amenity black
majority neighborhoods.20
A complementary way to depict the eects of an exogenous increase in the proportion of highly
educated blacks B, while holding W xed, is to directly examine the evolution of available neigh-
borhoods that arise in equilibrium. Using the simulated equilibrium outcomes for the model out-
lined above by varying B, for a given  > 0; Figure 2 plots the available equilibrium neighborhood
congurations in the \% Black" (horizontal axis) and \Amenity" (vertical axis) space for two dif-
ferent values of B: The left panel 2(a) shows that, when B is small, the sorting equilibrium is
18Potential multiple equilibria complicate our discussion. Here we are just referring to the possibility of such a
predominantly black high-amenity equilibrium. It should be intuitively clear that with same-race preferences, the
equilibrium with the highest degree of racial segregation actually maximizes landowner prots from house sales, i.e. it
is the equilibrium that maximizes the total housing prices of the neighborhoods. We assume that such an equilibrium
is likely to be selected. This allows us to assume away the coordination problem, and instead focus on the small
numbers problem, according to which middle-class black neighborhoods may not arise because of an insucient mass
of highly educated blacks. Coordination problems are likely to be a short-term phenomenon, as developers and other
entrepreneurs have an incentive to solve them.
19We apply a variant of the algorithm that solves numerically for sorting equilibria presented in Bayer, McMillan
and Rueben (2011). Given some starting allocation of households to communities and a vector of initial house prices,
the rst step of the algorithm involves calculating household demands over the available communities, allowing for
same-race preferences over neighborhood racial composition. From these demands, we compute a set of prices to clear
the housing market. Next, households are re-allocated to their preferred communities at these market-clearing prices.
Then we re-calculate household demands over communities, given the new neighborhood compositions, compute a
new set of market-clearing prices, and continue iteratively until the process converges.
20The empirics we present in Section 4 support the view that in the current conguration of U.S. cities, the
relationship between blacks' educational attainment (relative to whites) and residential segregation is likely to be on


























(b) When B is Suciently High.
Figure 2: Neighborhoods in the `% Black'-`Amenity' Space as B Increases, when Residents have
Same-Race Preferences.
unable to support high-amenity, black majority neighborhoods (i.e., neighborhoods in the north-
east quadrant) due to an insucient number of highly educated blacks with strong tastes for
amenities; instead, the small measure of highly-educated blacks with strong tastes for amenities
live in white-majority high-amenity neighborhood. However, the right panel 2(b) shows that, as
B becomes suciently high, high-amenity, black-majority neighborhoods start to emerge in the
north-east portion of the gure. The presence of such neighborhoods provides an opportunity for
racial segregation to increase, as we hypothesize.
The stylized depiction in Figure 2 has a useful analog in terms of scatterplots describing actual
cities. As we will see, Figure 3 in Section 3 presents scatterplots analogous to those shown in Figure
2, showing how the range of available communities can expand when the underlying demographic
structure of the MSA changes. Specically, Figure 3 is constructed using actual cross-sectional
Census data from U.S. cities, where Boston and St. Louis represent MSAs with low proportions
of highly educated blacks (B) and Atlanta and Baltimore-Washington DC represent MSAs with
high proportions. We discuss the relevant patterns in some detail next.
3 Neighborhood Availability in U.S. Metropolitan Areas
In this section, we describe three stylized empirical facts about the availability of neighborhoods
in U.S. metropolitan areas that help motivate our focus on the neighborhood formation mechanism.
Our primary data set is the 2000 U.S. Census, and our sample consists of 276 such Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs).21 Within each MSA, we examine the characteristics of its neighbor-
21We dene a Metropolitan Statistical Areas broadly as either (i) free-standing Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs) or (ii) Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) consisting of two or more economically and
socially linked metropolitan areas { Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs). For convenience, we use the
11hoods. In our primary analysis, a neighborhood corresponds to a Census tract, which typically
contains between 3,000 and 5,000 individuals. Using publicly-available Census Tract Summary
Files (SF3) from the 2000 Census, we characterize each neighborhood, so dened, on the basis
of two dimensions: the fraction of residents who are black and the fraction of residents who are
college-educated.22; 23
We list the empirical facts as follows, before discussing the Census-based evidence that underpins
them:
FACT 1. In almost every MSA, there are very few neighborhoods combining high fractions of
both college-educated and black individuals.
FACT 2. College-educated blacks live in a very diverse set of neighborhoods in each MSA. Sub-
stantial fractions live in predominantly white high-SES neighborhoods and substantial frac-
tions also live in predominantly black low-SES neighborhoods.
FACT 3. While predominantly black high-SES neighborhoods are concentrated in only a handful
of MSAs, the availability of these neighborhoods is increasing in the proportion of college-
educated blacks in the MSA population.
For reference, we note that blacks and whites constitute 11.1 and 69.5 percent, respectively, of
the U.S. population 25 years and older residing in MSAs. Among blacks, 15.4 percent have at least
a four-year college degree, while the comparable number for whites is over twice as high, at 32.5
percent. College-educated blacks constitute a mere 1.7 percent of the U.S. population residing in
MSAs.
[Table 1 About Here]
Table 1 provides very clear evidence relating to Fact 1 { the limited availability of high-SES black
neighborhoods. To give the overall distribution of neighborhoods purely on the basis of education
for comparison, Panel A lists the overall number of tracts in which more than 0, 20, 40 and 60
percent of individuals 25 years and older are at least college-educated, respectively. Panel B then
shows the number of tracts in the U.S. by both education and race (specically, the percentage of
individuals with a college degree and the percentage of individuals who are black), reporting the
term \MSA" to refer to all three cases.
22Our focus in this section is on non-Hispanic black and non-Hispanic white individuals 25 years and older residing
in U.S. metropolitan areas.
23The Census Summary Files necessitate the use of a single dimension to characterize socioeconomic status as they
only provide the joint distribution of race-by-income or race-by-education for a given neighborhood. In light of this
constraint, we use educational attainment to proxy socioeconomic status more generally on the basis that it is a
better predictor of one's permanent income than current income in the Census year.
12number of tracts in each of the education categories listed in the column headings that contain a
minimum fraction of blacks equal to 20, 40, 60, and 80 percent, respectively. As the corresponding
numbers show, a much smaller fraction of the tracts with a high percentage black also have a high
proportion of college-educated individuals. For example, while 22.6 percent (row 1, column 3) of
all tracts are at least 40 percent college-educated, only 2.5 percent (row 3, column 3) of tracts that
are at least 40 percent black are at least 40 percent college-educated, and only 1.1 percent (row 4,
column 3) of tracts that are at least 60 percent black are at least 40 percent college-educated. In
marked contrast, Panel C presents analogous numbers for whites, showing a far greater fraction of
neighborhoods with at least 40, 60, and 80 percent white meeting the education criteria listed in
the column headings.
While Table 1 reveals a scarcity of high-SES black neighborhoods in the U.S. as a whole, these
tracts are concentrated in only a handful of MSAs, and most notably Baltimore-Washington, DC.
(see Appendix Table 1). For example, of the 44 tracts (see row 4, column 3 of Table 1) that are
at least 60 percent black and 40 percent college-educated, 14 are in Baltimore-Washington DC, 8
in Detroit, 6 in Los Angeles, and 5 in Atlanta. This implies that in most MSAs, the availability of
high-SES black neighborhoods is even more limited.
Table 2 provides evidence relevant to Fact 2. It summarizes the characteristics of neighborhoods
in MSAs throughout the United States in which college-educated blacks reside. Given the absence
of mixed- or high-SES black neighborhoods, the table shows that highly educated blacks live in a
diverse set of neighborhoods, ranging from those that are predominantly white and highly educated
to neighborhoods that are predominantly black with much lower levels of education on average.
[Table 2 About Here]
In each MSA, we rst rank college-educated blacks by the fraction black in their Census tract
and assign individuals to their corresponding quintile of the associated distribution. Panel A then
summarizes the average fractions of black and college-educated individuals in the tract correspond-
ing to the quintiles of this distribution, averaged over all U.S. metropolitan areas. The numbers
show a clear trade-o for college-educated blacks between the fraction of their neighbors who are
black and the fraction who are highly educated: the average fraction of highly educated neighbors
falls from 38.0 percent for those college-educated blacks living with the smallest fraction of black
neighbors to 13.8 percent for those living with the largest fraction.24
Two aspects of this pattern are pertinent to our neighborhood formation mechanism. First,
24Comparison of Panels A and B in Table 2 reveals that college-educated blacks in each metropolitan area who
reside with the smallest fraction of other blacks have roughly the same fraction of college-educated neighbors as
college-educated whites do on average; however, college-educated blacks living in the top quintile of tracts (those
with the highest fraction of other blacks) have only about one-third of the fraction of highly educated neighbors as
whites do on average.
13the fact that such a high fraction of college-educated blacks live in segregated neighborhoods with
relatively low average educational attainment suggests that { whether due to preferences or dis-
crimination { race remains an important factor in the location decisions of a large number of
college-educated blacks. This helps to rule out an obvious potential explanation for the absence of
mixed- or high-SES black neighborhoods, namely that college-educated households simply demand
college-educated neighborhoods without regard to racial composition. Second, the fact that a sig-
nicant number of college-educated blacks reside in predominantly white neighborhoods makes it
possible for an increase in the availability of mixed- or high-SES black neighborhoods to lead to
greater segregation; if college-educated blacks were completely segregated in the absence of mixed-
or high-SES black neighborhoods, there would be little potential for segregation to increase.
In support of our third stylized fact, Table 3 reports four regressions that relate the log of the
number of tracts in an MSA that meet the race and education criteria specied in the column
heading to metropolitan socioeconomic characteristics (proportion highly educated black, highly
educated white, less-educated black and less-educated white) and the log of metropolitan area
population. These regressions reveal that the availability of middle-class black neighborhoods
increases sharply in the fraction of college-educated blacks in the MSA. Holding the size of the MSA
constant, a one percentage-point increase { just under a standard deviation { in the proportion of
college-educated blacks in an MSA (at the expense of the omitted category, Asians and Hispanics)
increases the number of tracts that are least 60 percent black and 40 percent college-educated by 42
percent, and the number that are at least 60 percent black and 20 percent college-educated by 56
percent. These eect sizes are substantially in excess of the mechanical increase that would arise
were the additional blacks distributed evenly across all the typical MSA's tracts { unsurprising
given the small fraction of the typical MSA population accounted for by college-educated blacks.
The number of middle-class black tracts is also increasing in the population of the MSA, as one
would expect (coecients not shown in the table).
[Table 3 About Here]
Neighborhood Scatterplots using Census Data. Related to this regression evidence in Table
3, Figure 3 shows scatterplots of available neighborhoods in four metropolitan areas: Boston and
St. Louis in Panel A, and Atlanta and Baltimore-Washington DC in Panel B. Note that in Boston
and St. Louis, the blacks with college degrees account for around 11 percent of the population,
while the fractions in Atlanta and Baltimore-Washington DC are approximately twice as high.
In each scatterplot, a circle represents a Census tract and its coordinates describe the fraction of
blacks (horizontal axis) and the fraction of college-educated individuals (vertical axis) in the tract.
The diameter of each circle is proportional to the number of college-educated blacks in the tract;
thus the largest circles correspond to the tracts where highly educated blacks are most likely to
14live. Panel A reveals a short supply of neighborhoods in Boston and St. Louis that combine high
fractions of both highly educated and black individuals { few neighborhoods appear in the north-east
corner of the plot. Panel B shows that a substantially greater number of neighborhoods combining
relatively high fractions of both black and highly educated individuals { those populating the north-
east corner of each gure { are found in the Atlanta and Baltimore-Washington DC metropolitan
areas. These scatterplots very much resemble stylized Figure 2, which illustrates neighborhood
formation derived from our model when residents have same-race preferences.
It is this third stylized fact along with the documented small number of middle-class black
neighborhoods in the vast majority of U.S. metropolitan areas (Fact 1) that motivates the idea
that an increase in the proportion of highly educated blacks within a metropolitan area should
allow middle-class black neighborhoods to form more readily. As these neighborhoods are likely
to be attractive to highly educated blacks, and possibly less-educated blacks as well, so their
emergence may lead to an increase in residential segregation on the basis of race once households
re-sort, along the lines of the model in Section 2. The potential for such re-sorting is apparent from
Fact 2, given that a non-trivial fraction of highly educated blacks currently reside in predominantly
white neighborhoods.
4 Research Design and Main Results
The theoretical and descriptive analysis of the previous two sections motivate our main empir-
ical hypothesis { that given the racial and socioeconomic compositions of most U.S. metropolitan
areas, residential segregation and racial inequality will be negatively related. Further, this negative
relationship arises { so we argue { through a process of neighborhood formation.
One possible approach to shedding light on this hypothesis is to mimic the stylized exercise
in Section 2, specifying household tastes over locational attributes, then estimating a structural
residential choice model using data drawn from a single metropolitan area (see, e.g., Bayer et al.
(2011)). In this paper, we take a dierent tack, making use of across-MSA data in order to assess
whether the neighborhood formation mechanism is important in practice. As we discussed in the
Introduction, this task is complicated by a host of factors other than neighborhood formation that
are also likely to inuence the relationship between segregation and inequality. Of course, the
observational data we use for our analysis make it extremely dicult to isolate exogenous variation
in the sociodemographic variables of interest; yet even in the absence of compelling instruments,
we argue that the pattern of observed correlations between MSA-wide segregation and inequality,
both cross-sectionally and over time, can be informative as to which of the potential mechanisms
are operating strongly in the data.
To explain the logic of our approach, consider as a starting point estimates of the cross-sectional






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16blacks, controlling for the educational attainment of whites.25 Such estimates will clearly reect
the overall impact of several alternative mechanisms, as discussed in the Introduction.26 In order to
distinguish the impact of our hypothesized neighborhood formation mechanism from the alternative
mechanisms, including CG's neighborhood eects mechanism, we take advantage of the dierential
timing of these mechanisms over the life cycle. In particular, the neighborhood eects mechanism
implies a negative relationship between concurrent measures of segregation and the educational at-
tainment of young blacks; as the metropolitan area evolves and individuals move within and across
metropolitan areas, this negative relationship should generally weaken with age. In contrast, our
neighborhood formation mechanism gives rise to a cross-sectional relationship between concurrent
measures of segregation and the educational attainment of blacks that should be positive for house-
holds of all ages, and potentially be even stronger for older households, who are more likely to
have made multiple residential location decisions during their lives. Consideration of this life-cycle
pattern suggests two complementary ways to distinguish the neighborhood formation mechanism
from the neighborhood eects mechanism empirically, which we describe below.
4.1 Research Design in Cross Section
The rst approach is cross-sectional. If we extend the analysis of Cutler and Glaeser (1997) to
older individuals (their paper focuses on ages 20-30), we should see a signicant weakening of the
eects that they nd. To that end, we follow CG and estimate regressions of the form:
yi = Xi
0 + 1segi + 2segi  blacki + i; (2)
where yi represents an individual outcome variable, segi is an MSA-level measure of segregation
of blacks and whites, blacki is a dummy variable taking value 1 if individual i is black, and
Xi includes individual demographic and MSA-level characteristics.27 We do so separately for
individuals aged 20-24 and 25-30, as in CG, but also for older age groups, between the ages of
30 and 70, with a focus on the eect of living in a more segregated metropolitan area for blacks
relative to whites, summarized by the coecient (2) on the segregation-black dummy interaction
term.
25We measure racial inequality using the educational attainment of blacks relative to whites (see the next subsec-
tion). On this basis, racial inequality in a city will thus be taken to have narrowed when the proportion of highly
educated blacks increases given white educational attainment. In turn, our main empirical hypothesis implies that
residential segregation will be positively related to the educational attainment of blacks, given the education of whites.
26To recap, these include { besides neighborhood formation { statistical discrimination in the housing market, racial
sorting on the basis of correlated socioeconomic characteristics, as well as CG's neighborhood eects mechanism.
27While CG's framework was developed to explore the importance of neighborhood eects, i.e., the impact of
MSA-wide segregation on the educational and labor-market outcomes of blacks relative to whites, controlling for



















































(b) The Net Eect
Figure 4: The Age Prole of the Relationship Between Concurrent Segregation and Black Educa-
tional Attainment
Figure 4 illustrates, in a stylized way, the age patterns associated with the neighborhood forma-
tion and neighborhood eects mechanisms, operating individually and in combination; it portrays
the underlying coecients measuring the segregation-education correlations for dierent age groups.
Specically, Panel 4(a) shows the positive relationship between concurrent measures of segregation
and the educational attainment of blacks relative to whites associated with the neighborhood forma-
tion mechanism, which is hypothesized to be positive and more or less stable across the age range.
It also shows the negative impact from the neighborhood eects mechanism, hypothesized to be
strongest among young blacks, though this declines with age. If both mechanisms are operating
strongly in the data, we might expect the neighborhood eects mechanism to dominate at younger
ages and the neighborhood formation mechanism, at older ages. Thus, as shown in Panel 4(b), the
net relationship between concurrent segregation in a metropolitan area and the educational attain-
ment of blacks relative to whites (captured by the relevant age group-specic coecient, 2) should
be negative for younger blacks relative to whites, but become positive for older blacks. Further,
if we did not distinguish blacks by age, we might observe that the average eects across all ages
canceled out; conducting the analysis disaggregated by age allows us to separately identify these
two eects.
4.2 Empirical Results in Cross Section
We implement the above cross-sectional research design using data that combine variables from
the 5-percent sample of the 1990 Census with the same set of MSA characteristics used in CG.28
Descriptive statistics for the MSA variables are shown in Appendix Table 2, the sample being drawn
28These latter data were generously made available by Jacob Vigdor.
18from the 209 metropolitan areas that have populations of at least a hundred thousand and at least
ten thousand blacks in 1990. Following CG, we measure residential segregation using dissimilarity
indices constructed for each MSA from racial compositions at the tract level { here, the proportions
of blacks and non-blacks.29 The mean value for the dissimilarity index is 56 percent, with a standard
deviation of 12.9 percent. The most segregated MSA in 1990 in the sample is Detroit (87.3 percent),
and the least is Jacksonville NC (20.6 percent).
We capture racial inequality in an MSA using the educational attainment of blacks relative to
whites. Accordingly, racial inequality will be taken to have narrowed in a cross-sectional context
when the proportion of highly educated blacks (the proportion with at least a college degree)
increases across MSAs given white educational attainment. In our 1990 Census sample, 22.7 percent
of the adult population have a college degree or more. For whites, the mean proportion is 24.6
percent, while for blacks, it is under half that, at 11.4 percent. Around these average dierences,
there is considerable variation in educational attainment by race across MSAs. At one extreme,
Stamford CT has the highest gap between the proportion of white with a college degree and the
proportion of black, at 38.6 percent, just slightly ahead of the San Francisco-Oakland MSA. At the
other extreme, Houma-Thibodoux LA, Danville VA and Fayetteville NC all have gaps between 7
and 8 percent.
Given our interest in the age prole of educational attainment by race, we further disaggregate by
age in Appendix Table 3. The pattern is similar for blacks and whites, with educational attainment
rising then falling across the age distribution. Considering blacks, for example, the proportion
graduating from college rises from around 12 percent for those in the 25-30 age range to over 15
percent for the 31-50 age group, falling to under 10 percent for blacks in the 51-70 age group.
Educational inequality is apparent throughout the age distribution, with black educational at-
tainment being markedly lower than for whites. The proportion of blacks graduating from high
school is between 10 and 12 percentage points lower than whites for all age groups except the oldest,
where the gap rises to more than 27 percentage points. And the proportion graduating from college
is substantially lower: around 10 percentage points lower for the 20-24 and 51-70 age groups, rising
to more than 15 percentage points for the middle age groups. This across-age variation in the
educational attainment of blacks versus whites is relevant for the rst part of our research design.
Appendix Table 3 also shows descriptive statistics for labor market outcome variables { log wages
and whether idle (both not working and not in school) { for the same age categories, and further
subdivided by race. In terms of earnings, black wages are almost uniformly 30 percent less than
those of whites. And blacks aged 30 or less are almost twice as likely as whites to be `idle,' though
29The dissimilarity index, proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1995), is an aggregate-level segregation measure (see
Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) for more discussion). Dissimilarity indices range from zero to one, and can be
interpreted as measuring the proportion of blacks who would need to change tracts in order for races to be evenly
distributed throughout the metropolitan area.
19this dierential erodes markedly as age increases. In the table, we also report descriptive statistics
for a set of individual demographic control variables included in the main regressions capturing an
individual's race and gender.
OLS Regression Results. Table 4 reports the coecient estimates for 2 on the interaction
term segiblacki in the specication described by (2). The individual outcomes we examine
include college graduation (column 1) and log earnings (column 2), pertaining to our notion of
high-SES individuals, along with high school graduation (column 3) and whether idle (i.e., nei-
ther unemployed nor in school, column 4). As in CG, all the specications include a rich set of
controls: individual characteristics (Black, Asian, Other nonwhite, Hispanic, Female), metropoli-
tan characteristics (Segregation, ln(population), Percent black, ln(median household income), and
Manufacturing share), and interactions of these metropolitan characteristics with a dummy variable
indicating whether the individual is black.
The specications in CG that relate most directly to our analysis are those using educational
attainment as the dependent variable. Table 4 replicates CG's results for age groups 20-24 and
25-30, but extends the analysis for individuals between the ages of 31-50, 51-70, respectively, the
latter two groups further broken down into 10-year age spans.
[Table 4 About Here]
The estimated 2 coecients in Table 4 for age groups 20-24 and 25-30 are very similar to those
reported in Cutler and Glaeser (1997, Table IV), with any minor discrepancies being attributable
to dierences in Census sample (we use the 5-percent while CG used the 1-percent Census sample).
For each outcome, the estimate for the 2 coecient on the \segblack" interaction implies a
signicantly worse outcome for younger blacks relative to whites, with the sole exception of college
graduation for the age group 25-30; and in this case also, the point estimate indicates that blacks
perform worse than whites.
In addition to being highly statistically signicant (excepting college graduation for the 25-30
age group), the implied eect sizes are also economically signicant, as noted in CG. Taking the age
group 20-24 for illustration, a one standard deviation increase in segregation (12.5 percent) would
lower the probability of graduating from high school for blacks by around 3.3 percentage points
relative to whites; it would lower the earnings of blacks relative to whites by around 6.8 percent;
the likelihood of being idle would rise (again relative to whites) by just over 4 percentage points;
and the probability of completing college would fall relative to whites by around 1.3 percentage
points (acknowledging that for this younger group especially, a fraction will have yet to complete
college).
The point estimates for the 25-30 age group are all of the same sign, and in some instances,
of roughly similar magnitude. It is worth noting, however, that all the point estimates, for each
20outcome, are lower in absolute value for the 25-30 age group than those for the 20-24 age group.
The eect of segregation on the likelihood of being idle is just over 10 percent lower for the 25-30
age group relative to the 20-24 age group, the eect on the probability of graduating from high
school is 20 percent lower; and the eect on the probability of college graduation is 28 percent
lower. The eect of increased segregation on dierences in log earnings of blacks versus whites is
substantially (around 65 percent) lower for the 25-30 age group than that for the 20-24 age group.
More strikingly, as we examine even older age groups (see row three and below in the table), the
eects of MSA segregation continue to dampen and, for key outcomes, change sign relative to the
young age groups, consistent with the predicted age prole of net eects depicted in Figure 4(b).
Consider rst the relationship between segregation and educational attainment of blacks relative
to whites. For college graduation, the negative eect of increased segregation on blacks relative to
whites becomes indistinguishable from zero for ages 31-50 { the point estimate is negative for ages
31-40, and positive for the 41-50 age group. It then becomes positive and signicant for ages 51-70.
In this case, a one standard deviation increase in segregation is associated with a 9 percentage
point increase in the probability that blacks graduate relative to whites { a large eect. The eect
for the 61-70 subcategory is even larger.
Similar pattern also holds for the other outcomes. For the relationship between segregation and
racial inequality in earnings, Column 2 of Table 4 shows that coecients on \segblack" also
switch from being negative to being positive and statistically signicant, now even for the 31-50 age
group, and the sizes of the eect are monotonically increasing with age. Thus, in marked contrast
to the 6 percent reduction found in the youngest age category, a one standard deviation increase
in segregation for ages 51-70 is associated with a 5 percent increase in the wages of blacks relative
to whites. The pattern of changes for the coecient estimates on \segblack" for dierent age
groups are less dramatic for high school graduation (Column 3) and idleness (Column 4), but they
both show that the eects of MSA segregation continue to dampen for older age groups. For
example, 20-24 year old blacks are 33.9 percent more likely to be idle than same aged whites in
more segregated MSAs, but the 31-40 year old blacks are only 20.8 percent more likely to be idle
than same aged whites, and that the dierence further declines to 17.6 percent for 41-50 year olds
and 10.9 percent for 51-60 olds.
We take these results as strong baseline evidence in support of both the existence of the neigh-
borhood formation mechanism that is the focus of this paper and the neighborhood eects channel
identied by CG. At face value, the results suggest that in the very same highly segregated metropol-
itan areas, older blacks have signicantly higher levels of educational attainment and earnings
relative to whites (compared to their counterparts in less segregated cities), while younger blacks
have signicantly worse outcomes relative to whites. This pattern is exactly what one would expect
given the combined operation of the neighborhood formation and neighborhood eects mechanisms,
working dierentially across black households of dierent ages, as depicted in Figure 4.
21Instrumenting. The OLS results in CG and replicated in the top portion of our Table 4 are
supplemented by a series of IV estimates, shown in Table V of their paper where they instrument
for MSA segregation with three instruments designed to isolate the causal impact of segregation
on individual outcomes. CG motivate the use of instruments by suggesting that their negative
coecient estimates from the OLS regressions might be attributable to within-metropolitan area
sorting; specically, segregation might be higher in metropolitan areas where blacks had poor
socioeconomic characteristics relative to whites as a result of sorting on the basis of socioeconomic
characteristics. This corresponds to the view that segregation and racial inequality are likely to be
positively related { the reverse of our neighborhood formation story.
It is worth noting that when CG instrument for segregation, the point estimates on the interac-
tion between black and segregation in the college degree and log earnings regressions become more
negative in every case (for both age groups and with each alternative instrument - a total of 12
regressions). This suggests that our neighborhood formation mechanism, representing the reverse
channel of causality that their instruments are intended to purge, is actually working against their
result, as it leads the correlation between black socioeconomic status and metropolitan segregation
to move in a positive rather than a negative direction. This evidence further implies that CG's OLS
specications may understate the strength of the neighborhood eects channel that is the primary
focus of their empirical analysis.
Based on this discussion, the OLS and IV results reported in CG can be fully reconciled with
the results presented here. The interpretation we oer, in the spirit of the rst part of our research
design, is that dierences in the impact of segregation across the age prole reect the operation
of two separate and competing mechanisms, with each mechanism working to obscure the other
in the data. Because many individuals migrate across metropolitan areas during adulthood and
metropolitan level segregation evolves (slowly) over time, one would generally expect the negative
relationship associated with CG's mechanism between segregation in an individual's current MSA
and educational outcomes to be strongest for the youngest adults. (This is why CG study young
adults in the rst place.) Conversely, the positive correlation between average black educational
attainment relative to whites and metropolitan segregation associated with our neighborhood for-
mation mechanism on should be strongest among older age groups. Older individuals collectively
have had the greatest amount of time to inuence the metropolitan neighborhood structure, in-
cluding segregation levels, of the MSA they reside in.
4.3 Research Design in First Dierences
In the second part of our research design, we use the fact that the life cycle patterns we exploited
in the rst part of our research design also give rise to a strong prediction concerning the relationship





























(b) The Net Eect
Figure 5: The Age Prole of the Relationship Between the Changes in Segregation and Changes in
Blacks' Educational Attainment
Consider the relationship between the change in segregation in an MSA and the change in black
socioeconomic status over time { for instance, comparing across decennial censuses, as we will do
in subsection 4.4 { while controlling for changes in the socioeconomic status of whites.
In this case, the operation of the neighborhood eects mechanism in CG implies that the change
in segregation can only directly aect the educational attainment of younger blacks relative to
younger whites and should have no eect on that of older age groups. The neighborhood formation
mechanism, in contrast, should continue to generate a positive relationship between the relative
educational attainment of blacks (versus whites) and segregation at all ages. Relative to the cross-
sectional relationship in levels, therefore, the neighborhood formation mechanism should more
fully dominate the neighborhood eects mechanism in rst dierences. Moreover, the relationship
between these variables attributable to the neighborhood formation mechanism should be identied
by the correlation between changes in segregation and changes in black educational attainment
relative to whites observed for older individuals.
Figure 5 highlights, again in a stylized manner, the age prole associated with the relationship
between changes in segregation and changes in black educational attainment relative to whites. For
blacks who are middle-aged and older, as Panel 5(a) indicates, we should expect that the changes in
the MSA segregation in the previous decade should have no eect on changes in their educational
attainment compared to whites due to the neighborhood eects mechanism in CG. This is so
because their educational (and human capital investment) decisions were largely complete around
age 25. In contrast, the positive relationship due to the neighborhood formation mechanism is
more or less constant. Thus on net, we would expect to see a strong positive relationship in the
data between changes in metropolitan segregation and changes in black educational attainment for
older blacks controlling for changes in the educational attainment of whites, as shown in the Panel
235(b).
To implement our second approach using changes over time, we will estimate equations at the
metropolitan area level of the form:
segj = 1%-Highly-Edu-Blackj + Xj
0 + j; (3)
where segj represents the change in MSA j's segregation (captured by a relevant segregation
index) between the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, %-Highly-Edu-Blackj is the change in percent
highly educated black in MSA j over the same time period, and Xj includes MSA-level changes
in other sociodemographics across Census years, including changes in the percentage of highly
educated whites. Interest focuses on the coecient 1, which we hypothesize to be positive if
the neighborhood formation mechanism dominates. Note that the rst dierences research design
also allows us to deal with identication issues associated with time-invariant omitted MSA-level
characteristics that may inuence neighborhood availability and are also correlated with the MSA's
demographic structure.
4.4 Empirical Results for First Dierences
To estimate equation (3), we extract the same individual and MSA variables used in the cross-
sectional analysis for 1990 (see Table 4), but for the 2000 Census as well. We then average the
variables up to the MSA level, and construct rst dierences for each MSA based on 1990 and 2000
MSA averages. Descriptive statistics are given in Appendix Table 4, for the sample of 214 MSAs
appearing in both waves.30 The rst feature to note from Appendix Table 4 is that segregation,
measured at the MSA level using dissimilarity indices, fell quite sharply over the decade; on average,
dissimilarity indices were 5.4 percent lower, with a standard deviation of 4.1 percent.31 This accords
with a fact that has been well-documented: for example, as Iceland, Weinberg and Steinmetz (2002)
show in a thorough analysis of past Census data, residential segregation in U.S. cities has been
following a downward trend over the three decades since the 1980 Census, a conclusion that is
invariant to the way segregation is measured.
Appendix Table 4 also provides suggestive aggregate evidence that racial inequality has increased
over the same decade. While the proportion of blacks with a college degree increased only very
slightly between 1990 and 2000, the proportion of whites with a college degree rose by around
2.2 percentage points. In the same broad direction, while the proportion of less educated blacks
remained virtually unchanged, the proportion of less educated whites fell sharply. The table also
30For this analysis, unlike in Subsection 4.2, we no longer restrict attention to MSAs that have at least 100,000
individuals and 10,000 blacks, which increases the sample of MSAs slightly. Our results are insensitive to this, one
way or the other.
31The MSA with the largest drop over the decade was Fort Collins-Loveland CO, down 19.7 percent. This is in
sharp contrast to Ann Arbor, at the other end of the spectrum, where segregation actually rose by 11.5 percent.
24reports rst-dierence changes in MSA characteristics, using the same variables controlled for in
levels in Table 4. The population of the typical MSA rose by almost 18 percent between 1990
and 2000, in line with the overall population increase in the United States over the same decade.
Median household incomes rose signicantly; the average share of manufacturing fell, by almost
ve percentage points; and the black population in the typical MSA rose just fractionally.
First-Dierence Regression Results. Table 5 reports the estimation results for four speci-
cations given by Equation (3). We regress the change in the MSA-level dissimilarity index between
1990 and 2000 on a variety of measures of the change in the sociodemographic composition of the
metropolitan area over the same period, along with other metropolitan controls.
[Table 5 About Here]
Column 1 reveals a strong positive relationship between the change in the fraction of blacks
with a college degree in the MSA population and the change in segregation, controlling for other
changes in the education composition of the MSA and also changes in log population. Specically,
our estimate indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in the fraction of highly educated
blacks, holding xed the education composition of whites, would lead to about a one-percent
increase in the dissimilarity index. This is a large positive eect in the order of a quarter of a
standard deviation in the change in the dissimilarity index over the decade. The nding is robust
to the inclusion of additional MSA-level covariates, measuring changes in median household income
and manufacturing share, as shown in Column 2.
To further investigate the role of age structure along the lines hypothesized in Figure 5, we break
the eect of changes in the proportion of highly educated blacks in an MSA relative to whites down
by age in Columns 3 and 4. Specically, we measure the eects of changing the proportion of
highly educated blacks in two separate age categories { 25-44 and 45 or older { on the change in
the MSA segregation; we also break down the other education controls (for less-educated blacks,
and highly and less-educated whites) in the same way. Column 3 just controls for changes in log
population, while Column 4 also controls for changes in the MSA median household income and
manufacturing share between 1990 and 2000. The results from this age disaggregation reported
in Columns 3 and 4 make very clear that it is changes in the proportion of older highly educated
blacks, aged 45 and above rather than 25-44, that aect residential segregation in rst dierences.
Indeed, the estimates indicate that eectively all the positive impact of changes in the proportion of
highly educated blacks comes through the older age category, with estimated eect sizes similar to
those for highly educated blacks in Columns 1 and 2: the eects for the younger group are actually
slightly negative, if indistinguishable from zero. This striking age pattern is again consistent with
Figure 5 where we argued that the neighborhood formation mechanism and the neighborhood
25eects mechanism of CG seem to cancel out for younger adults, leaving no signicant relationship
on net.
5 Complementary Analysis and Robustness
5.1 Neighborhood Formation
Complementing the analysis of changes in segregation over time just described, we provide
evidence of neighborhood formation using the same organization of the rst-dierenced MSA data
as in Section 4.4. Unlike the cross-sectional estimates in Table 3, rst-dierencing has the advantage
that it removes the inuence of xed factors, whether observed or unobserved, that aect the
relationship between racial inequality and MSA-wide neighborhood availability. Specically, we
examine the relationship between the changes in the proportion of highly educated blacks and
the changes in the number of middle-class black neighborhoods within an MSA, conditioning on
changes in other MSA sociodemographics.
[Table 6 About Here]
Table 6 provides evidence relating to the formation of middle-class black neighborhoods, focusing
on the eects of within-MSA variation in the proportion of highly educated blacks, controlling for
changes in the education composition of other groups. Columns 1-4 show results based on dierent
denitions of `middle-class black neighborhood,' the dependent variable being the change in the
log number of tracts satisfying the given denition in the column heading. Column 1 shows that
a one-standard deviation increase in the proportion of highly educated blacks, controlling for the
education of whites, is associated with a 22 percent increase in the number of middle class black
communities, dened as tracts that are both at least 60 percent black and 40 percent college
educated. The estimated eects are even larger when considering broader denitions of `middle-
class black neighborhood.' 32
[Table 7 About Here]
While Table 6 shows that increases in the proportion of college-educated blacks are associated
with sharp increases in the number of middle-class neighborhoods in the MSA, the life-cycle logic
we emphasized in Section 4 suggests that, to the extent that residential choices are mostly made
by relatively older individuals, we should expect to see stronger associations between the changes
in the number of middle-class neighborhoods and the changes in the proportion of older college-
educated blacks. This is indeed conrmed in Table 7, where we report the eects of changing
32In each column, we control for changes in log population of the MSA. The results are robust to the inclusion of
changes in log(median income) and manufacturing share.
26the proportion of younger versus older highly educated blacks in an MSA on middle-class black
neighborhood formation, again conditioning on other sociodemographics. It shows the consistently
positive impact of increasing the proportion of older college-educated blacks (aged 45 and above),
while changes in the proportions of younger college-educated blacks (aged 25-44) tend to be smaller,
and are insignicant for the narrowest denition of middle-class black neighborhoods (at least 60
percent black and at least 40 percent college-educated).
5.2 Across-MSA Sorting
So far, the results presented in Table 4-7 provided supportive evidence consistent with our neigh-
borhood formation mechanism. However, our evidence is based on least squares estimates, given
that it is extremely challenging to nd valid instruments for changes in MSA racial and educational
composition. To the extent that the changes in MSA black education composition between 1990 and
2000 are not necessarily exogenous, one might be concerned that sources of these changes may give
rise to spurious correlations unrelated to our neighborhood formation hypothesis. In this subsec-
tion, therefore, we consider an alternative possible explanation for a positive relationship between
segregation and racial inequality. This is due solely to across-MSA sorting, where highly educated
blacks dierentially migrate to MSAs with more middle-class black neighborhoods, instead of our
neighborhood formation mechanism, which has focused implicitly on within-MSA sorting.
To address the likely strength of this alternative, we make use of rich Census microdata pro-
viding information on the metropolitan area in which each individual lived ve years prior to the
Census. These data allow us to examine the extent to which highly educated blacks are drawn
disproportionately to metropolitan areas that have a larger number of middle-class black neighbor-
hoods. Such a migration pattern could generate the kinds of cross-sectional results shown for older
adults in Table 4 if black in-migrants were signicantly more educated than those who already lived
in segregated metropolitan areas.
[Table 8 About Here]
Table 8 reports the results of a series of regressions that relate the neighborhood structure in an
individual's current metropolitan area to a set of individual education-race categories for a sample
of individuals aged 20-30.33 The dependent variable in the set of regressions shown in Columns 1-3
is the number of tracts in the individual's current MSA that are at least 60 percent black and 40
percent college-educated.
The regression shown in Column 1 is estimated on a sample of individuals who moved to a new
MSA between 1995 and 2000 and includes xed eects for the MSA the individual resided in 5
33We focus on these younger adults on the basis that they are more likely than others to move to a new metropolitan
area during a given ve-year period.
27years prior to the Census year. In essence, this specication compares the characteristics of newly-
chosen metropolitan areas for two individuals who resided in the same metropolitan area ve years
ago. The results demonstrate clearly that college-educated blacks are indeed more likely to choose
MSAs with a greater number of neighborhoods that are at least 60 percent black and 40 percent
college-educated than all other types of individuals. For example, relative to college-educated
whites leaving the same MSA, college-educated blacks choose MSAs that have an average of 0.9
more tracts meeting these criteria (the average number of such tracts for all U.S. metropolitan areas
is only 0.3). Such across-MSA sorting is clearly consistent with the notion that metropolitan areas
with a higher fraction of middle-class black neighborhoods are particularly attractive to college-
educated blacks. This nding accords both with individuals' same-race preference as specied in
our model and the fact that most U.S. MSAs contain a very limited number of middle-class black
neighborhoods.
It is important to point out that this kind of across-MSA sorting is unlikely to be responsible for
the negative relationship between segregation and racial inequality we documented earlier. To see
this, Columns 2 and 3 in Table 8 report the results of corresponding specications for individuals
who, respectively, do and do not migrate across MSAs during this ve-year period, dropping the
xed eects for the lagged MSA.34 The resulting coecients reveal a remarkably similar pattern
to those reported in Column 1. That an almost identical pattern obtains for stayers as movers
implies that the proportion of college-educated blacks in the sample of migrants into MSAs with
a greater number of middle-class black neighborhoods is roughly the same as the proportion of
college-educated blacks already residing in these MSAs. Thus, while college-educated blacks do,
in fact, systematically migrate to MSAs with a high number of middle-class black neighborhoods,
this migration does not systematically change the socioeconomic structure of these MSAs. In
turn, this pattern of migration does not systematically contribute to cross-sectional dierences in
MSA educational composition of the blacks, allowing us to rule out this type of sorting as an
explanation for the positive relationship between segregation and black educational attainment
relative to whites.
As a further robustness check, Columns 4-6 repeat the analysis using the number of tracts in the
individual's current MSA that are at least 40 percent black and 40 percent college-educated. These
results are similar to those presented in Columns 1-3 in that there is little discernible dierence
when comparing movers and stayers.
5.3 Cohort Eects? Cross-Sectional Results for 2000 Census
Another potential concern is that the age pattern we document in Table 4 is not a life-cycle
eect as we argue, but it represents cohort eects instead. To distinguish age eect from cohort
34Additional xed eects for the lagged MSA cannot be included for stayers since they did not move.
28eect, we report in Appendix Table 5 the same analysis we carried out in Table 4 but using the
2000 Census instead of the 1990 Census.35 Comparing interaction coecients in each column of
this table against the corresponding entries in Table 4 reveals a similar pattern and similar point
estimates. In the case of college education, shown in the rst column, there is evidence of a mild
steepening of the prole in 2000 relative to 1990 { slightly more negative to slightly more positive
{ and the estimates are somewhat more precise. For log earnings, the prole is somewhat atter,
becoming positive for the 41-50 age group rather than the 31-40 age group in 1990 (though in this
latter case, the point estimate is imprecise). These estimates make clear that a very similar age
prole to that reported in Table 4 for the 1990 Census emerges using 2000 Census data.
On a related theme, Collins and Margo (2000) report the interaction coecient from a series
of CG-style regressions for the log(earnings) of individuals aged 20 to 30 as far back as the 1940
Census. They estimate an eect of roughly the same magnitude (though statistically insignicant)
as that reported by CG for 1990.36
6 Implications
The results reported in Sections 4 and 5, taken together, provide strong evidence underlining
the important role neighborhood formation plays in generating the relationship between racial
inequality and residential segregation. In this section, we discuss the broader signicance of our
ndings in terms of the inter-related dynamics of segregation and inequality.
The joint presence of the neighborhood formation mechanism (which predicts a negative relation-
ship between residential segregation and racial inequality) and the neighborhood eects mechanism
of CG (which predicts a positive relationship) points toward the operation of a negative feedback
loop aecting the joint evolution of residential segregation and racial socioeconomic inequality. For
example, suppose that government policies aimed at improving inner city schools are able to re-
duce racial educational inequality in an MSA. Our neighborhood formation mechanism predicts
that this will lead to an increase in segregation among blacks of all education levels; the increase in
segregation will then, via Culter and Glaeser's (1997) neighborhood eect mechanism, in turn lead
to lower educational attainment among young blacks relative to whites, undoing some of the initial
reduction in racial inequality over time. The operation of this negative feedback loop implies that
the movement towards racial convergence will tend to be inhibited and slow.
[Table 9 About Here]
Relevant to the unresolved issue of the strength of the feedback, we also note that the eects
35The summary statistics for the 2000 micro Census data are provided in Appendix Table 6.
36They interpret this evidence as supporting the notion that \ghettos did not turn bad" (drawing on the title of
CG's paper) in more recent decades.
29of the negative feedback may be mitigated when the proportion of highly educated blacks in an
MSA is suciently high. To see this, Table 9 reports a series of OLS regression results whose
specications are similar to that of (2) used in Table 4, with the exception that we now add the
triple interaction segiblacki(% metro black and college educated).37 Columns 1-4
focus on the sample of 20-24 age group and Columns 5-8, the 25-30 age group. As in Table 4, we
examine the four outcomes, high school graduation, college graduation, log earnings and whether
idle. The coecient estimates indicate that, even though segregation is negatively correlated with
black outcomes relative to whites for these two young age groups, a result conrming Cutler and
Glaeser (1997, Table IV) and our own Table 4, a signicant exposure to highly educated blacks
actually has a positive eect on individual outcomes. For example, for high school graduation,
the coecient estimate of the term segiblacki(% metro black and college educated)
suggests that being exposed to the negative inuence of segregation on younger blacks' high school
graduation rate will be reduced by about 15 percent due to the exposure of more highly educated
blacks. This result thus suggests the possibility that, when there is suciently high proportion of
highly educated blacks in an MSA, we may break out of the negative feedback loop and achieve a
simultaneous reduction in residential segregation and racial inequality.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that residential segregation may rise, somewhat counter-intuitively,
when racial dierences in education and other sociodemographics narrow. We proposed a mech-
anism that could generate such a negative inequality-segregation relationship, involving a process
of neighborhood formation. As motivation for this, given the scarcity of middle-class black neigh-
borhoods in many U.S. cities, we noted that highly educated, high-income blacks are forced to
choose from either predominantly white neighborhoods with high levels of neighborhood ameni-
ties or neighborhoods with higher proportions of blacks and fewer amenities. In the face of such
a neighborhood availability constraint, increases in black socioeconomic status relative to whites
would, we argued, lead to the formation of new middle-class black neighborhoods, and these could
in turn be attractive to blacks, especially those who were highly educated, permitting increases in
residential segregation as inequalities across race narrowed.
In order to examine the importance of this neighborhood formation mechanism in practice,
alongside competing mechanisms also likely to inuence the inequality-segregation relationship, we
proposed a new two-part research design, yielding distinctive cross-sectional and time-series predic-
tions. Cross-sectionally, we argued that dierential relations between black educational attainment
relative to whites and segregation over the life cycle allow us to distinguish the neighborhood forma-
tion mechanism from the well-established `neighborhood eects' mechanism of Cutler and Glaeser
37Of course, we also add the interaction Black  (% metro black and college educated) in Table 9.
30(1997). While the neighborhood eects mechanism should operate only for younger blacks, whose
education is either on-going or only recently completed, our neighborhood formation mechanism
should operate, in contrast, for blacks of all ages, thus showing up most clearly for older blacks.
This age pattern in the correlation between racial inequality and residential segregation should dis-
tinctively reveal the presence of our neighborhood formation mechanism. In rst dierences over
time, the latter mechanism should dominate, and be identied by the rst-dierence eect found
for older blacks.
We implemented this two-part design using Census data, showing that there was indeed a
negative cross-sectional relationship between inequality and segregation for older blacks, based
on both the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. In terms of the time series evidence, we also showed that
increases in the proportion of highly educated blacks in a metropolitan area between 1990 and 2000,
controlling for the education of whites, are associated with greater racial segregation; and when we
looked specically at older blacks, we found even stronger increases in city-wide segregation, likely
reecting the strength of neighborhood formation alone. Further, changes between 1990 and 2000
within-MSA clearly indicate that increases in average educational attainment of blacks relative to
whites are associated with sharp rises in the number of middle-class black communities, consistent
with the operation of the neighborhood formation mechanism.
In terms of the broader implications of our analysis, we noted at the outset that racial inequal-
ity and residential segregation are linked in an intergenerational feedback loop, with segregation
inuencing racial inequality in the present, which then aects household residential sorting and so
future segregation, in turn inuencing socioeconomic inequality. Our results, in combination with
the ndings of CG, indicate that the feedback is negative in character, likely to inhibit reductions in
segregation and racial inequality over time. This has obvious policy relevance. In terms of shedding
light on the strength of the feedback, we also identied conditions under which the eects of this
negative feedback loop are likely to be mitigated, namely when the proportion of highly educated
blacks in a city is suciently high.
It is worth drawing attention to another channel, related to the formation of preferences, that
might also serve to weaken the negative feedback loop. The results in our paper are based entirely
on the recent range of data across U.S. cities, where we never get very close to racial equality.
And it is possible that if racial inequalities in education and income were reduced signicantly, so
the general strength of racial preferences might also weaken, with racial segregation declining as
a result. Endogenizing preferences in this fashion presents an important, as well as challenging,
area for future work. Further, to explore the inter-related dynamics of segregation and inequality
more explicitly calls, naturally, for a dynamic model that incorporates both neighborhood sorting
and education production. The task of developing and estimating such a model also provides a
worthwhile avenue for future research.
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34Table 1: Number of Tracts in United States in 2000 by Race and Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All >20% >40% >60%
Panel A: All Tracts
(1)    All 49,021 26,351 11,094 3,005
100.0% 53.8% 22.6% 6.1%
(2)    > 20% Black 9,149 2,567 641 59
100.0% 28.1% 7.0% 0.6%
(3)    > 40% Black 5,657 1,164 142 14
100.0% 20.6% 2.5% 0.2%
(4)    > 60% Black 3,921 623 44 5
100.0% 15.9% 1.1% 0.1%
(5)    > 80% Black 2,559 271 21 1
100.0% 10.6% 0.8% 0.0%
(6)    > 20% White 43,179 25,178 11,041 2,999
100.0% 58.3% 25.6% 6.9%
(7)    > 40% White 39,602 24,566 10,839 2,967
100.0% 62.0% 27.4% 7.5%
(8)    > 60% White 35,154 22,543 10,214 2,870
100.0% 64.1% 29.1% 8.2%
(9)    > 80% White 26,910 17,539 8,102 2,339
100.0% 65.2% 30.1% 8.7%
Percent College Degree or More
Note: The top number in each cell gives the number of tracts meeting both the education criterion
described in the column heading (e.g., greater than 40 percent college-educated) and the race criterion in
the row heading (e.g., greater than 40 percent black); the bottom number in each cell gives the number of
tracts meeting each race and education criterion as a fraction of the number of tracts meeting each race
criterion. Tract compositions are calculated using individuals 25 years and older in U.S. metropolitan
areas. Tracts considered in this table have a minimum of 800 such individuals (the average tract in the
full sample has slightly over 3,000).  
Panel B: Tracts by Percent Black
Panel C: Tracts by Percent WhiteTable 2: Neighborhood Patterns for College-Educated Individuals in the United States in 2000
Panel A: College-Educated Blacks
College-educated blacks first ranked within each MSA by percent black in Census tract.
Average tract composition reported by corresponding quintile, averaging across all MSAs.
Quintile 12345Overall
Percent Black 5.7 14.4 28.3 54.6 78.9 32.0
Percent College-Educated 38.0 31.6 26.2 18.4 13.8 27.2
Percent Black and College-Educated 1.3 3.3 6.2 8.0 10.0 5.2
Panel B: College-Educated Whites 
College-educated whites first ranked within each MSA by percent white in Census tract. 
Average tract composition reported by corresponding quintile, averaging across all MSAs.
Quintile 12345Overall
Percent White 55.0 77.9 86.6 90.4 94.5 77.4
Percent College-Educated 27.0 36.2 40.7 39.3 39.2 35.3
Percent White and College-Educated 20.1 30.4 36.2 36.1 37.4 30.4
Note: The panels of the table summarize the average distribution of neighborhoods in which college-educated blacks and
whites in U.S. metropolitan areas reside, respectively, using data from the 2000 Census. To construct the numbers in Panel
A, college-educated blacks in each MSA are ranked by the fraction of blacks in their tract and assigned to one of five
quintiles for that MSA. Average neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics are then reported for each quintile,
averaging across all MSAs. Overall averages are given in the last column. Panel B reports analogous figures for college-
educated whites, first ranking by their tract-level exposure to whites within each MSA. Tract compositions are calculated
using individuals 25 years and older in U.S. metropolitan areas.Table 3: The Availability of Middle-Class Black Neighborhoods in 2000
Dependent Variable: log(number of tracts in
MSA >60% black and 
>40% college-
educated)
log(number of tracts in
MSA >60% black and 
>20% college-
educated)
log(number of tracts in
MSA >40% black and 
>40% college-
educated) 
log(number of tracts in
MSA >40% black and 
>20% college-
educated)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Metropolitan Composition
% Black with College Degree 42.16*** 55.70*** 36.14*** 38.51***
(10.28) (11.33) (13.35) (11.37)
% Black with less than College Degree -4.51*** 0.49 -1.52 5.22***
(1.83) (2.34) (2.42) (2.21)
% White with College Degree -1.64 1.06 0.49 3.52***
(1.20) (1.49) (1.55) (1.62)
% White with less than College Degree 0.06 1.77*** -0.21 1.84**
(0.57) (0.73) (0.65) (0.81)
Notes: The four regressions reported in this table relate various measures of the availability of middle-class black neighborhoods to the
sociodemographic composition of the metropolitan area using 2000 Census data. Metropolitan-level observations (N = 276) are weighted by
population,and the log of the population is includedas an additionalcontrol. Standarderrors are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significanceat
the 1-percent level, and ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level.Table 4: Segregation and Metropolitan Composition -- Age Profile in 1990






31-40 -0.034 0.146* -0.125*** 0.208***
(0.062) (0.087) (0.037) (0.037)
41-50 0.058 0.268*** -0.100** 0.176***
(0.055) (0.090) (0.050) (0.032)
51-70
51-60 0.061 0.417*** -0.118* 0.109***
(0.040) (0.114) (0.064) (0.035)
61-70 0.087*** 0.480*** -0.004 0.104***
(0.031) (0.185) (0.065) (0.036)
Notes: This table reports coefficients from a series of regressions based on the specification used in Cutler and Glaeser
(1997) to generate their Table IV. The specification includes individual characteristics [Black, Asian, Other nonwhite,
Hispanic, Female], metropolitan characteristics [Segregation, ln(population), Percent black, ln(median household
income), Manufacturing share] and interactions of these metropolitan characteristics with whether the individual is black.
The coefficient on Black*Segregation is reported here for four individual outcomes and for six age ranges. Cutler and
Glaeser report results for individuals between the ages of 20-24 and 25-30, respectively. The coefficients in the table for
these ages are not identical to those reported in Cutler and Glaeser but are very close, most likely attributable to the fact
that we use the 5-percent sample of the 1990 Census while the 1-percent sample is used by Cutler and Glaeser. All other
measures are identical, as we used the same metropolitan characteristics used by Cutler and Glaeser, generously made
available by Jacob Vigdor on his website.





























*** denotes significance at the 1-percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and * denotes significance 

























(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Metropolitan Characteristics
% Black with College Degree all adults 2.573*** 2.924***
(0.728) (0.788)
age 25-44 -1.042 -0.273
(1.311) (1.346)
age 45+ 4.489*** 3.504**
(1.319) (1.461)
% Black with less than College Degree all adults -0.031 -0.159
(0.226) (0.167)
age 25-44 -0.153 -0.614
(0.337) (0.356)
age 45+ 0.528 0.867
(0.487) (0.506)
% White with College Degree all adults -0.009 -0.009
(0.127) (0.123)
age 25-44 -0.053 0.015
(0.198) (0.201)
age 45+ 0.088 0.021
(0.190) (0.188)
% White with less than College Degree all adults 0.396*** 0.275***
(0.095) (0.092)
age 25-44 0.233 0.157
(0.148) (0.145)
age 45+ 0.427*** 0.295**
(0.131) (0.142)
Controls for Change in log(Population)?  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Changes in Other Metropolitan Variables?  No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports coefficients and standard errors from two regressions of the change in the metropolitan dissimilarity index
between 1990 and 2000 on the changes in metropolitan sociodemographiccomposition over this same period. All four columns include
the change in log(population) as a control. Columns (2) and (4) also include changes in log(median income) and in manufacturing
share. Regressions are based on the sample of metropolitan areas that appear in both 1990 and 2000 (N=214). *** denotes
significance at the 1-percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and * denotes significance at the 10-percent level.  Table 6: Middle-Class Black Neighborhoods and Metropolitan Composition - First Differences
Dependent Variable:
Δ log(number of 
tracts in MSA 
>60% black and 
>40% college-
educated)
Δ log(number of 
tracts in MSA 
>60% black and 
>20% college-
educated)
Δ log(number of 
tracts in MSA 
>40% black and 
>40% college-
educated)
Δ log(number of 
tracts in MSA 
>40% black and 
>20% college-
educated)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Metropolitan Characteristics
% Black with College Degree 22.03*** 39.54*** 35.98*** 53.36***
(4.91) (5.96) (5.17) (5.88)
% Black with less than College Degree -6.76*** -9.67*** -6.76** -7.33***
(1.52) (1.86) (1.60) (1.83)
% White with College Degree -1.85** 0.21 -1.73* 0.73
(0.85) (1.03) (0.89) (1.02)
% White with less than College Degree -1.45** -0.29 -0.78 0.15
(0.63) (0.76) (0.66) (0.75)
Notes: The table reports coefficientsand standard errors from four regressions that relate changes in the number of middle-classblack
neighborhoods between 1990 and 2000 to the change in metropolitan educational composition over this same period, along with the
change in the log of the metropolitan area population. Regressions are based on the sample of metropolitan areas that appear in both
1990 and 2000. *** denotes significance at the 1-percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and * denotes
significance at the 10-percent level.  Table 7: Segregation, Middle-Class Black Neighborhoods and Metropolitan Composition - First Differences
Dependent Variable:
Δ log(number of 
tracts in MSA 
>60% black and 
>40% college-
educated)
Δ log(number of 
tracts in MSA 
>60% black and 
>20% college-
educated)
Δ log(number of 
tracts in MSA 
>40% black and 
>40% college-
educated)
Δ log(number of 
tracts in MSA 
>40% black and 
>20% college-
educated)
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Δ Metropolitan Characteristics
% Black with College-Degree
adults - age 25-44 10.44 31.01*** 31.97*** 38.85***
(9.12) (11.13) (9.61) (10.85)
adults - age 45+ 33.72*** 47.49*** 47.31*** 61.92***
(9.11) (11.12) (9.61) (10.84)
Notes: The table reports coefficientsand standard errors from four regressions that relate changes in the number of middle-
class black neighborhoods between 1990 and 2000 to the change in metropolitan educational composition over this same
period, focusingon changes in the percentage of youngerversus older blacks with a college degree. Regressions are based on
the sample of metropolitan areas that appear in both 1990 and 2000. *** denotes significance at the 1-percent level, **
denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and * denotes significance at the 10-percent level.  Table 8: Assessing Across-Metropolitan Area Sorting
Dependent Variable:
Sample: Movers Movers Stayers Movers Movers Stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual Characteristic:
Black with College Degree 1.075*** 1.165*** 0.903 2.702*** 3.104*** 2.798***
(0.107) (0.147) (0.812) (0.254) (0.326) (1.198)
Black with less than College Degree 0.197*** 0.253*** 0.380 0.079 0.372** 1.463
(0.054) (0.087) (0.681) (0.129) (0.186) (1.293)
White with College Degree 0.157*** 0.17* -0.248 0.833*** 1.144*** 0.126
(0.053) (0.094) (0.577) (0.110) (0.160) (0.950)
White with less than College Degree  -0.499***  -0.561*** -0.704  -1.38***  -1.446*** -1.609
(0.052) (0.075) (0.562) (0.139) (0.141) (0.969)
Notes: The six regressions reported in this table each relate a measure of the availabilityof middle-class black neighborhoodsto an individual'srace-education
category. All regressions use a sample of individualsaged 20-30 in 2000. Separate regressions are reported for individuals who moved between metropolitan
areas and those who did not in the fiveyearsprior to the 2000 Census. For movers,a specificationthat includesfixedeffectsforthe MSA of residencein 1995 is
also reported. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the metropolitanlevel are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significanceat the 1-percent level, **
denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and * denotes significance at the 10-percent level.  
Number of tracts in MSA >60% Black and >40% 
College-Educated
Number of tracts in MSA >40% Black and >40% 
College-Educated
Includes fixed effects for MSA of 
residence 5 years prior to Census?
Yes No No Yes No NoTable 9: Enhanced Cutler-Glaeser Regressions: The Effect of Metropolitan Segregation on Individual Outcomes
Coefficients on interactions between black and metropolitan segregation (dissimilarity index) and proportion college-educated blacks in metro area reported
Age 20-24 Age 25-30
HS College HS College
Graduate Graduate Ln(Earnings) Idle Graduate Graduate Ln(Earnings) Idle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cutler-Glaeser Regressions
Black*Metro Dissimilarity -0.269*** -0.094*** -0.788*** 0.340*** -0.201*** -0.064 -0.433*** 0.310***
Index (Segregation) (0.041) (0.032) (0.140) (0.031) (0.039) (0.062) (0.094) (0.038)
Adding Interactions with (%  Metro Black and College-Educated)
Black*Segregation -0.412*** -0.101*** -1.123*** 0.387*** -0.241*** -0.016 -0.505*** 0.394***
(0.080) (0.039) (0.260) (0.070) (0.072) (0.065) (0.164) (0.083)
Black* Segregation* (% Metro 13.60*** 2.40 20.06* -5.26* 6.21* -0.88 6.07 -7.45**
 Black and College Educated) (4.32) (3.30) (12.25) (3.09) (3.67) (5.94) (7.93) (3.06)
Black* (% Metro -8.89*** -2.13 -9.36 4.00* -3.02 0.54 -0.82 4.51**
 Black and College Educated) (2.95) (2.36) (8.81) (2.49) (2.59) (4.22) (5.32) (2.03)
Notes: This table reports the results of a series of OLS regressions based on the specifications in Table IV of Cutler and Glaeser (1997). Each specification includes individual characteristics 
[Black, Asian, Other nonwhite, Hispanic, Female], metropolitan characteristics [segregation, ln(population), % black, ln(median household income), manufacturing share] and interactions of 
these metropolitan characteristics with whether the individual is black. The upper panel replicates their results, reporting the coefficient on the interaction between whether the individual is 
black and metropolitan segregation. The lower panel reports the results of regressions that add interactions with the proportion of the metropolitan population that is college-educated and 
black. This measure is included directly and interacted with the level of segregation in the metropolitan area. Both of these variables are in turn interacted with a dummy indicating whether the 
individual is black. Coefficients are reported for only interactions with whether the individual is black. All regressions use the metropolitan variables used by Cutler and Glaeser, which Jacob 
Vigdor has generously made available on his website.    




Fraction of blacks with 
college degree
Percentage black >80% >60% >40% (in millions)
Percentage with college degree >40% >40% >40%
Baltimore-Washington 5 14 33 5.06 0.24 0.21
Detroit 5 8 19 3.51 0.19 0.13
Chicago 3 16 6.11 0.16 0.15
New York 4 15 14.88 0.15 0.17
Los Angeles 4 6 10 11.50 0.06 0.18
Atlanta 5 5 8 2.65 0.26 0.22
Cleveland 1 6 1.96 0.15 0.11
Philadelphia 1 5 4.12 0.17 0.13
San Francisco-Oakland 5 4.95 0.06 0.19
Raleigh-Durham 1 3 0.65 0.12 0.22
Indianapolis 3 1.05 0.12 0.14
Jackson, MS 1 1 2 0.44 0.25 0.17
Houston 1 1 2 3.10 0.15 0.18
Columbia, SC 2 0.59 0.17 0.17
New Orleans 2 0.85 0.33 0.13
All U.S. Metropolitan Areas 21 44 142 154.84 0.11 0.15
Notes: Tract compositions are calculated using individuals 25 years and older in U.S. metropolitan areas. Tracts considered in this table have a minimum of 800
such individuals.
Number of tracts meeting both race            
and education criteriaAppendix Table 2: Metropolitan Area Characteristics for 1990




ln(MSA population) Percent Black ln(median income) Manufacturing Share
Number of Cities 209 209 209 209 209
Mean 0.586 13.1 0.138 10.3 0.172
Standard Deviation 0.126 1.0 0.092 0.2 0.069
Minimum 0.206 11.6 0.009 9.9 0.036
Maximum 0.873 16.0 0.457 11.0 0.456
Notes: The sociodemographic variables are obtained using the 5-percent sample of the 1990 Census.Appendix Table 3
Summary Statistics for 1990 Census Micro Data
Variable White Black White Black White Black White Black
Education
High school graduate 87.7% 75.9% 89.9% 79.2% 90.9% 77.4% 76.4% 48.8%
College graduate 14.8% 5.0% 28.8% 12.3% 31.5% 15.3% 19.7% 9.2%
Work and income
Idle 12.6% 30.6% 14.7% 27.6% 15.5% 23.7% 48.8% 52.8%








Notes: This table is analogous to Cutler and Glaeser (1997) Table 2, though using the 1990 Census 5-percent rather than the 1-percent sample.
It adds columns for ages 31-50 and 51-70.  The education categories are not exclusive.  'Idle' corresponds to not working and not being in school. 
417,838 627,503 1,766,671 1,051,655
51.6% 51.6% 51.6% 53.5%
8.0% 6.2% 4.0% 2.8%
4.3% 3.4% 2.3% 1.3%
1.4% 1.1% 0.9% 0.9%
15.1% 13.3% 12.3% 11.2%
Age 20-24 Age 25-30 Age 31-50 Age 51-70Appendix Table 4:





Dissimilarity Index -0.054 0.041 -0.197 0.115
% Black with College Degree 0.002 0.004 -0.008 0.018
age 25-44 0.000 0.002 -0.011 0.010
age 45+ 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.011
% Black with less than College Degree 0.001 0.020 -0.060 0.142
age 25-44 -0.002 0.012 -0.039 0.057
age 45+ 0.003 0.010 -0.021 0.085
% White with College Degree 0.023 0.023 -0.035 0.125
age 25-44 -0.011 0.014 -0.061 0.049
age 45+ 0.035 0.016 -0.003 0.103
% White with less than College Degree -0.066 0.057 -0.179 0.593
age 25-44 -0.056 0.031 -0.107 0.257
age 45+ -0.009 0.033 -0.106 0.336
Log(Population) 0.177 0.175 -0.161 1.009
Log(Median Household Income) 0.344 0.055 0.188 0.542
-0.046 0.039 -0.196 0.037
Percent Black 0.005 0.013 -0.038 0.051
Manufacturing Share
Notes: This table is based on a sample of 214 MSAs.Appendix Table 5: Segregation and Metropolitan Composition -- Age Profile in 2000





20-30 -0.118*** -0.299*** -0.207*** 0.304***
(0.033) (0.074) (0.032) (0.040)
31-50
31-40 -0.038 -0.087 -0.138*** 0.247***
(0.037) (0.074) (0.040) (0.031)
41-50 0.047 0.148** -0.063 0.223***
(0.036) (0.062) (0.044) (0.028)
51-70
51-60 0.095** 0.305*** -0.034 0.126***
(0.041) (0.091) (0.053) (0.028)
61-70 0.063** 0.307* -0.030 0.013







(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.137*** -0.478*** -0.271*** 0.321***
(0.026) (0.103) (0.037) (0.053)
-0.101** -0.187*** -0.151*** 0.291***
(0.044) (0.072) (0.034) (0.042)
0.005 0.026 -0.104*** 0.237***
(0.035) (0.058) (0.039) (0.027)
0.084*** 0.306*** -0.037 0.076***
Notes: This table reports interaction coefficients using the same specifications underlying Table 4, though
using 2000 rather than 1990 Census data. *** denotes significance at the 1-percent level, ** denotes
significance at the 5-percent level, and * denotes significance at the 10-percent level.  
(0.033) (0.088) (0.058) (0.027)Appendix Table 6
Summary Statistics for 2000 Micro Data
Variable White Black White Black White Black White Black
Education
High school graduate 85.8% 76.1% 87.7% 82.0% 89.5% 80.9% 83.8% 66.1%
College graduate 13.7% 6.2% 33.1% 16.4% 32.2% 16.7% 27.3% 13.8%
Work and income
Idle 14.3% 29.1% 17.6% 28.1% 18.8% 29.3% 43.6% 52.1%







N 640,546 823,613 3,019,416 1,724,116
49.5% 50.3% 50.9% 52.4%
21.2% 19.9% 13.3% 8.5%
15.1% 13.6% 9.0% 5.1%
5.4% 6.1% 5.0% 4.1%
13.9% 12.9% 12.3% 10.6%
Age 20-24 Age 25-30 Age 31-50 Age 51-70